Briefing: Geddes v Secretary of State for Justice
A legal gap at the heart of the Single Justice Procedure: how judicial authority is actually engaged in the individual case
Last night I filed an updated Particulars of Claim in my High Court case regarding the Single Justice Procedure. I’m grateful to those who have covered the court fees — donations are still open, as costs are ongoing. By the time I finally got out of my chair around 1am, after about six hours of solid work at my laptop, my legs were so stiff I could barely walk. Probably not ideal for my health or general wellbeing.
Today I have more or less repeated the exercise, and produced a public briefing document on the case. It sets out, in accessible form, what the problem is that the claim addresses, and what is at stake more broadly. This is “bedrock” type legal work — relatively uncommon — aimed at a very narrow geometry of what is justiciable: not too abstract, not too messy, and not so disruptive that it cannot be heard.
It is also public-interest litigation, where the issues go to something quite fundamental: how authority is constituted and how accountability scales alongside it in a system increasingly reliant on automated administration of justice. Getting that balance right matters. We are already seeing the tension between an implacable supply of “robojustice” and the limits of human capacity to engage with it.
I hope you find the briefing useful, and perhaps also a little thought-provoking.
Claim KB-2025-LDS-000187
CPR Part 8 (with amended PoC dated 15 April 2026)
Clarity and Contestability of Judicial Authority under the Single Justice Procedure
If the law no longer says how a case comes before a court, what, in law, makes it one?
1. What this claim is (and is not)
This is a Part 8 claim seeking declaratory relief on a question of statutory construction about how the Single Justice Procedure (“SJP”) operates. There is no substantial dispute of fact and no relief is sought beyond legal clarification. The claim is not an appeal, judicial review, or collateral challenge. It does not seek to affect any individual determination or the validity of the statutory scheme. It is confined to prospective clarification of the statutory framework.
2. The question before the Court
How does the statutory scheme establish that proceedings begun by written charge are formally before (that is, within the authority of) a magistrates’ court in the individual case, and how is that position maintained as they move between procedural stages?
3. How the question arises
Under the historic model, proceedings were initiated by the “laying of an information” before a magistrates’ court — the formal act that brought a case into being and within the authority of a determinate tribunal. Continuity of jurisdiction followed from that clear point.
The modern scheme replaces that step with institution by written charge issued by the prosecutor, combined with the Single Justice Procedure. Unlike the earlier system, there is no single, visible judicial step at which the case is brought before a court, even though legal consequences already follow from that status.
Within that framework:
proceedings are instituted without a physical act equivalent to the laying of an information before a court;
determination may occur on the papers (typically decided by a single magistrate without a hearing); and
proceedings may subsequently move to ordinary adjudication in open court upon entry of a not-guilty plea.
4. The trilemma: possible bases of attribution
The statutory scheme therefore admits of only three possible legal bases of attribution in law:
(a) a case-specific juridical act by which a magistrates’ court is seised;
(b) attribution by administrative initiation, designation, or handling within the system; or
(c) attribution arising from the operation of the statutory scheme as a whole, without any distinct act of attachment.
These are not alternative descriptions of the same phenomenon, but distinct bases of explanation, each with materially different legal consequences:
If (a) is correct, the constitutive act must be identifiable in principle and capable of verification on the record.
If (b) is correct, the statutory basis for treating administrative process as constitutive of jurisdiction must be identified and justified.
If (c) is correct, the Court must confront whether coercive criminal jurisdiction may arise without any case-specific juridical act or rule capable of identification in the individual case.
A refusal to determine which of these bases applies does not avoid the issue. It amounts, in substance, to acceptance of the third position: that jurisdiction may arise and operate without any legally identifiable mechanism in the individual case.
5. Why the question matters in practice
The Single Justice Procedure now handles a very large volume of cases, most of which are dealt with on the papers and without a hearing unless a not-guilty plea is entered. Individuals are expected to engage with the process through written notices alone and may later find their case moving to an ordinary magistrates’ court hearing.
In practice, a person may receive formal notices, enter a plea, and become subject to legal obligations without any clear statement — either in the notices or in the statutory framework — of how, in law, their case has become “before a magistrates’ court”. Documents often name a specific court or location, which appears to identify the tribunal exercising authority.
However, where the underlying statutory mechanism is not explicitly identified, such references risk being treated as sufficient in themselves in law, rather than as referring to the legal mechanism.
6. Practical consequences for the individual
That status is not merely technical: it determines the lawful exercise of judicial power, the obligations placed on the individual, and the continuity of proceedings across stages. Without it, a defendant may be left unsure which court is, in law, seised of the case, how many courts are involved, which tribunal should be impleaded if issues arise, and how the designations used in official documents relate to the underlying juridical reality.
The question raised by this claim is therefore one of legal necessity: how that status is established and maintained so that it can be clearly identified, followed, and — if necessary — challenged.
7. Contestability of authority
The question also has a broader constitutional dimension. These issues are closely linked: the way authority is explained determines whether it can be identified and tested in the individual case at all.
Different models of explanation — whether authority arises from a specific judicial act, from administrative process, or from the statutory scheme taken as a whole — do not simply describe the same thing in different ways. Each invokes distinct constitutional issues worthy of review, and tends to place the basis of authority beyond effective challenge.
The right to a fair hearing under Article 6 includes the right to be tried by a tribunal established by law — not as an abstract concept, but in a form that can be identified and tested in the individual case.
Where the legal basis by which proceedings are treated as before a court is not clearly articulated, it cannot be effectively tested in the individual case.
What is not clearly expressed in law cannot be meaningfully verified against the statutory framework and is liable to be treated as a given in practice — “this is just how the system works” — rather than established in law and open to review. In that situation, the individual’s ability to identify the tribunal, understand the source of its authority, and, where appropriate, challenge that authority depends on assumption rather than clearly articulated legal grounds.
This engages concerns recognised in international rule-of-law frameworks, including those reflected in the European Convention on Human Rights, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and the Venice Commission’s rule-of-law checklist.
The present claim does not assert that those safeguards are absent. It seeks to ensure that the legal mechanism by which proceedings are treated as before a court is sufficiently articulated to allow those safeguards to operate as intended.
8. Procedural posture, utility, and limits
By application dated 15 April 2026, the Claimant has sought permission to amend the Particulars of Claim to clarify and narrow the issue as a question of statutory construction. The Defendant is the Secretary of State for Justice, who bears statutory responsibility for the framework governing magistrates’ courts and the Single Justice Procedure.
The claim is deliberately confined to a question of statutory construction. It does not seek to advance or determine any challenge to the jurisdiction of a magistrates’ court in any individual case. It isolates a prior and necessary step: identification of the legal mechanism by which that status is established and maintained in the individual case.
A declaration would promote legal certainty by making clear how the statutory scheme operates in this respect. This is of practical utility given the volume of cases handled under the Single Justice Procedure and the need for clarity as to how proceedings are treated as before a court in the individual case as they move between procedural stages.
Absent such identification, the Court is in substance being asked to accept that coercive criminal jurisdiction may operate in the individual case without any legally identifiable mechanism of attribution, and instead by reference to administrative process alone.
Martin Geddes
Claimant / Litigant in Person
16 April 2026