The "campaign for real courts" treatise
A constitutional analysis of why we cannot tolerate misrepresentation of authority
I am finding this battle for personal liberty—and the constitutional repair of “ghost courts”—to be utterly exhausting. After years of being battered by the state as a whistleblower and activist, especially through the Covid-era fallout, the toll is no longer abstract: it lives in my body. Trauma shadows my days. I can still summon bursts of productivity in the mornings, sometimes again late at night, but afternoons often demand rest. This summer has offered no space for real holiday or unstructured respite. I am not complaining—my life remains a good one—but the sheer drain of facing jurisdictional abuse on both sides of the Atlantic at once is undeniable.
As part of my Part 8 filing for declaratory relief—asking the High Court itself to acknowledge that it too has “seen a ghost”—I have prepared a preamble briefing. It is not a pleading, but rather the distillation of many long hours bent over my laptop, time I might prefer to spend on anything else. Whether I “win” in court is almost immaterial. The deeper trial is of the justice system itself: can it answer the simplest question of lawful authority? My role is to record whether it can. Real victory lies in readers like you taking this forward, sharing it, and together refusing to accept the state’s misrepresentation of authority—whether in the naming of a court, or in any other guise.
This text is deliberately adaptable. You may recycle it into your own filings, or use it to teach youngsters civics. It is not theoretical instruction, but lived, practical knowledge: the kind required to defend yourself from the “rule of lawyers” rather than the rule of law. What may set it apart is my use of a consulting toolkit—the Minto Pyramid Principle—framing the situation, complication, undesired outcome, desired outcome, question, and answer. Everything hinges on the right question, and that question is already gifted to us in the ancient writ of quo warranto: by what authority do you act?
PS — the article title is a pun on CAMRA, for my American readership.
CONSTITUTIONAL MEMORANDUM:
QUO WARRANTO?
Jurisdictional Defects and the Problem of Non-Statutory Courts
This memorandum is filed and served to assist the Court in understanding the constitutional implications of the Claimant’s application. It is not evidence, nor does it form part of the formal pleadings. The issue raised is binary: whether the tribunal in question lawfully exists as a court of record. That question admits only of “yes” or “no.”
If the answer is “no,” the defect is not confined to this case: it belongs to a wider class of breach, namely the administration of justice by a body not lawfully constituted. But equal danger arises if the answer “yes” is given too lightly. A lax standard of proof in establishing lawful warrant dilutes the safeguard of quo warranto itself, permitting unlawful tribunals to pass as lawful ones.
The present claim is an instance of a larger constitutional problem. While the arguments reference a single prosecution, the memorandum sets out the framework within which such defects must be understood generally. It shows how both a false ‘yes’ and a neglected ‘no’ erode the constitutional settlement as a whole.
1 WHEN IS A COURT NOT A COURT?
A magistrates’ court exists only by lawful constitution. Statutory authority for its creation is found in the Courts Act 2003, which provides for the establishment of magistrates’ courts and their jurisdiction within local justice areas. Where no such act of creation can be demonstrated, there is no court in law, and any proceeding it conducts is a nullity.
Difficulties arise when administrative devices are substituted for statutory constitution. Composite names, rebranded titles, or IT-generated identifiers may obscure the legal identity of the tribunal. Such devices cannot substitute for the existence of a juridical body, accountable to Parliament and subject to public oversight.
If the identity of the court cannot be grounded in lawful creation, there is no proper respondent to petition, no office-holder against whom duties can be enforced, and no lawful tribunal to which a defendant is answerable. In such a case, the right of accountability becomes illusory, because the supposed court is not a recognisable organ of state authority.
Accepting administrative constructs in place of courts is not a technical irregularity but a structural breach of constitutional principle. It permits coercive power to be exercised without lawful jurisdiction, contrary to the safeguards enacted by Parliament and to Article 6 ECHR and Article 14 ICCPR, which guarantee a tribunal established by law. Proceedings of such a body are void ab initio and incapable of cure.
2 PRINCIPLES OF CONSTITUTIONAL JUSTICE
The following principles define the lawful existence of a tribunal and the limits of judicial power:
1. Courts of record must have a lawful warrant. A tribunal only exists if created by statute or prerogative. Coke CJ emphasised that no man should be subject to a court without a warrant in law.
2. Jurisdiction must be evidenced, not presumed. Theoretical authority is worthless if the body cannot prove its lawful constitution when challenged; failure to prove is fatal.
3. Proceedings of a non-existent court are void ab initio. As established in Anisminic [1969] 2 AC 147, jurisdictional error nullifies proceedings absolutely; they cannot be cured retrospectively.
4. The right to challenge validity endures at any stage. Boddington [1998] UKHL 13 confirms that defendants may contest the lawfulness of a tribunal or order whenever it is relied upon, including collateral challenge.
5. Constitutional safeguards are indivisible. To allow even a single unlawful tribunal undermines the settlement of justice as a whole; nullity infects not just the case, but systemic legitimacy.
6. Pseudo-courts nullify statutory courts. A body that is not created by statute cannot borrow the name of one that is. To accept a pseudo-court as valid is to nullify the statutory court it imitates.
7. Delegation cannot create judicial existence. Delegation transfers duties but cannot create a court. Only statutory naming under the Courts Act 2003 establishes a tribunal. Without this, jurisdiction is void, preventing arbitrary executive power.
8. Ubi jus ibi remedium applies. Where a lawful court exists, there is a proper respondent to petition and officer accountable. In the converse situation, accountability itself collapses as jurisdiction is presumed rather than proven.
9. Truth-claim in court name. The heading “Magistrates’ Court” is not cosmetic; it is a truth-claim. It asserts jurisdiction via lawful constitution as fact, and if that fact is false, no adjudication can lawfully follow.
10. International guarantees of fair trial apply. Article 6 ECHR and Article 14 ICCPR require that tribunals be “established by law.” A body not lawfully constituted cannot meet this threshold. These instruments bind the United Kingdom and form part of the bedrock of constitutional justice.
If accepted as true, they are the baseline against which the present claim must be judged. Jurisdiction is a matter of proof, not assumption. A court of record must be capable of demonstrating its lawful constitution by reference to statute or charter. No logo, letterhead, or IT system artefact can substitute for a statutory foundation. Without such warrant, no lawful authority exists.
3 RISKS OF IGNORING THE BINARY CONSTITUTION TEST
If these principles are disregarded — answering “yes” when the reality is “no” — the consequences are profound:
1. Erosion of public trust. Citizens cannot respect verdicts issued by a body unable to prove its lawful existence; legitimacy collapses into perception of sham justice.
2. Systemic procedural degradation. A “shadow” system of pseudo-courts risks bypassing statutory safeguards (CrimPR, GDPR), normalising shortcuts and silence.
3. Overloading of the ‘court’ name. Having ‘real’ and ‘virtual’ uses of the label “Magistrates’ Court”, with both statutory and non-statutory uses, creates semantic dilution: the ordinary citizen cannot know which is real, nor how to challenge it.
4. Mass impact through the Single Justice Procedure. With approaching 1M cases annually, even one defective tribunal contaminates huge volumes of proceedings; the scale magnifies small errors into systemic breakdown.
5. Administrative usurpation. Court staff or agencies may “moonlight” as judges without statutory warrant, shifting adjudication into the hands of administrators without constitutional authority.
6. Civil–criminal boundary erosion. Unconstituted courts blur civil and criminal jurisdiction, bypassing safeguards like Article 6(2) ECHR’s presumption of innocence. This risks arbitrary enforcement, diluting protections.
7. Downstream chaos. Appeals multiply, enforcement actions unravel, and administrative systems buckle when void orders, referencing nullities as ‘courts’, are allowed to circulate unchecked.
8. Inconsistent naming obstructs appeals. Non-statutory naming of tribunals obstructs statutory appeal routes: uncertainty arises over whether to proceed under s.142, s.111, or s.108 of the Magistrates’ Courts Act.
9. Collapse of binary test. If proof of lawful constitution is not enforced, the distinction between court and non-court blurs, replacing rule of law with bureaucratic discretion. Two tiers of court imply two tiers of justice, which is no justice at all.
10. Reversal of Anisminic. To treat a jurisdictional defect as an “irregularity” is to reverse the principle of Anisminicit renders the void curable by mere labelling, and empties nullity of force.
11. A “National Bench” creates diffused responsibility. If every magistrate is notionally everywhere, able to oversee ‘real court’ or ‘virtual court’ hearings, then no magistrate is accountable anywhere.
If these consequences are ignored, they define the price of error: the systemic cost of treating an unlawful tribunal as lawful.
4 THE STAKES OF ENFORCEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The consequences fall into two divergent paths — one protective, one destructive.
If the binary is enforced (lawful warrant required):
Constitutional integrity preserved. The settlement under the Bill of Rights and Courts Act 2003 remains intact; only lawfully created courts administer justice.
Rule of law reaffirmed. Citizens retain the right to challenge jurisdiction (Anisminic; Boddington), knowing unlawful proceedings are void ab initio.
Systemic discipline restored. The Single Justice Procedure and similar mass processes remain bounded by statutory safeguards; annual caseloads (1M+) are protected against silent degradation.
Public confidence maintained. Legitimacy is visible: the tribunal proves its own warrant when challenged, demonstrating transparency and authority.
If the binary is not enforced (pseudo-courts tolerated):
Parallel justice systems emerge. Administrative “moonlighting” is normalised, bypassing judicial checks.
Retrospective patching attempted. Authorities may seek to “cure” void proceedings post hoc, undermining certainty of law and creating arbitrary outcomes.
Contamination of proceedings. Thousands of convictions risk collapse, with appeals and judicial reviews flooding the system.
Constitutional settlement destabilised. If unlawful courts are allowed to operate, the distinction between law and administration collapses, hollowing out the separation of powers.
To permit even a single unlawful tribunal is to plant contagion: it licenses every body with a name or a stamp to claim judicial power. Such collapse is not gradual but systemic; confidence in all adjudication falters once the binary of lawful existence is blurred.
5 STRICTLY ENFORCING THE BINARY IS THE ANSWER
The safeguard lies in quo warranto — the question “by what authority?” The State bears the burden of proving lawful constitution when called upon.
Failure to prove is fatal. Proceedings by a non-existent court are void ab initio and cannot be retrospectively cured. Anisminic establishes nullity; Boddington [1998] UKHL 13 affirms the citizen’s right to challenge authority at any stage.
The Court is therefore required to enforce the binary: lawful or unlawful, “yes” or “no.” There is no third category.
Far from being disruptive, acknowledging a common jurisdictional defect is the only path that preserves the Single Justice Procedure and protects the rest of the constitutional framework. Refusing to do so accelerates decay; conceding it draws a clear line, restores discipline in court creation, and preserves public trust in the courts.
6 CONCLUSION
The present claim is factually trivial but constitutionally fundamental. The rule of law demands that justice may be administered only by lawfully constituted courts. If a tribunal cannot prove its warrant, it cannot exercise jurisdiction. To uphold that principle is to preserve the constitutional settlement; to disregard it is to invite its collapse.
Part 8 procedure remains properly narrow: the relief sought here is concise and specific. Yet if the defect is upheld, the implications reach far beyond this prosecution. They place in doubt the legality of other proceedings conducted under the Single Justice Procedure, and indeed any adjudicative body purporting to sit without statutory authority.
The memorandum therefore maps the systemic consequences of such jurisdictional voids. The principle engaged is not minor: justice in the United Kingdom can only be administered by lawfully constituted courts, and any departure from this requirement creates structural risk across the whole system.
The Claimant respectfully submits this memorandum to assist the Court and makes no further submissions beyond those in the Skeleton Argument. Part 8 procedure is the modern vehicle for the ancient writ of quo warranto: the disciplined means by which a court is asked “by what authority?”
Prepared by: Martin Geddes
Date: 18 August 2025
I am in awe of what you are accomplishing and pray you will remain hale and hearty through until the end of this process and beyond when you can take a well-deserved and lengthy sabbatical.
The substance of these astonishing Substack posts should be emailed to every law firm in the UK.